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JUS';"lCE: THURGOOD MARSHALL 
§.uvrrm.t ~ourt of t1J r ~ltttttb §-tn.tn 
1II as lyin¢.Dn. ~. <!i. 2U? n ;,l 
J une 28, 1983 
Re : No . 82-52-Arizo na Governing Committee v. Norris 
?-'.tDiORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
In response to the revision in footnote 7 of the dissent 
to include Arizona Stat. Ann. 620-448, I have revised the 
second and third paragraphs of footnote 17 on pages 13 and 14 
of my opinion to read as follows: 
Although petitioners contended in the Court of 
Appeals that their conduct was exempted from the 
reach of Title VII by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §1011 et seq., 
they have made no mention of the Act in either their 
petition for certiorari or their brief on the merits. 
"[O]nly in the most exceptional cases will we consider 
issues not raised in the petition," Stone v. Powell, 
428 U.S. 465, 481 n. 15 (1976); see Sup. Ct. R. 2l(a), 
and but for the discussion of the question in the 
dissent we would have seen no reason to address a 
contention that petitioners deliberately chose to 
abandon after it was rejected by the Court of Appeals. 
1/AfJ 
Since the dissent relies on the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, however, post, at 5-7, we think it is appropriate 
to lay the matter to rest. The McCarran-Ferguson Act 
provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed 
to invalidate, impair, or supercede any law enacted by 
any State for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance, ••• unless such Act specifically relates 
to the business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. §1012(b). 
The application of Title VII in this case does not 
supercede the application of any state law regulating 
"the business of insurance." As the Court of Appeals 
explained, 671 F.2d, at 333, the plaintiffs in this 
case have not challenged the conduct of the business 
of insurance. No insurance company has been joined 
~s a.defendant, and our judgment will in no way preclude 
any ~nsurance company from offering annuity benefits 
that are calculated on the basis of sex-segregated 
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actuarial tables. All that ia at issue in this case 
ia an !!plOyment practice: the practice of offering 
a .. -re employee ttie opportunity to obtain greater 
moDthly annuity benefits than could be obtained by a 
st.ilarly situated female employee. It is this 
conduct of ~e employer that is prohibited by Title 
VIZ. By its own te:rma, the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
applies only to the business of insurance and has no 
application to employment practices. Arizona plainly 
is not itself involved in the business of insurance, 
since it baa not underwritten any riaka. See Union 
Pireno, u.s. , (1982) 
was 1 lnteiide4 p:r:!iliirily to 
1\t:t>a·~~J:wl~~·t;ry cooperation' in the under-
in or:i91nal), 
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